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The New Politics of Trade: EU-Japan  
Unlike the European Union’s (EU) negotiations with the US and Canada, the 
Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations have 
encountered few critics from civil society organisations (CSO) and therefore 
became an ‘exceptional’ case for the EU. There are four reasons. The first is that 
the main focus of the EPA is still on ‘old’ issues such as tariff reduction of 
motorcars, electronics and agricultural products. The second is the relative lack 
of innovative proposals compared to the American and Canadian case. The third 
is Japan's lack of ability and competitiveness to export its regulations, making 
Japan’s attitude relatively defensive. Finally, the modest scale of Japan-EU trade 
compared to transatlantic trade. These four reasons made the level of contestation 
relatively low, but this has not led to an acceleration of concluding the EPA. 
Uncertainty caused by Trump and the Brexit referendum have made Japan’s trade 
policy complicated and unpredictable. 
 
Keywords: European Union (European Communities); EPA (economic 
partnership agreement); Japan 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Following the deadlock of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) multilateral rounds, 
the US, the European Union (EU) and the other industrialised countries including Japan 
raced toward negotiating bilateral trade agreements. Based on decisions of the Council 
of Foreign Ministers, the European Commission has negotiated Free Trade 
Agreement/Economic Partnership Agreements (FTA/EPA) with countries and regions 
outside Europe. While the European Commission pursues its ambitious aim to write the 
rules of global trade, the negotiations with the US over the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP, Dominguez this volume) and Canada over the 
Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA, Hübner, Balik and Deman this 
volume) have faced criticism from civil society organisations (CSO). Compared to these 
contested cases, the EPA negotiations with Japan have encountered few critics.
1
 Why 
and to what extent has the Japanese case become an ‘exception’ to the EU’s debated 
role in regulating markets? 
Japan’s relations with the EC/EU and its member states were first investigated 
by Gilson (Gilson 2000) whose findings were later confirmed by Keck (Keck, et.al. 
2013). These studies highlighted how the trade conflicts of the past (Tanaka 1998, 225; 
Rothacher 1983, 259) had transformed into cooperative mutual understanding between 
Global partners (Suzuki 2015b; Hook et.al. 2007). Despite having been a challenge to 
European foreign trade, Japan fails to appear in discussions of the historical process that 
has seen the EU emerge as a global trade power (Meunier, Nicolaïdis 2011, 275-295). 
Laursen has demonstrated how the ASEAN, in which Japan has crucial interests but is 
not a full member, has provided a distant model compared to the EU (Laursen 2010). 
On the contrary Smith described EU-Asian relations as a “microcosm of global trade 
governance (Smith 2013, 387-389),” emphasising the commonness between the two 
regions. Yet, why have CSOs not contested the EU-Japan EPA as a hostile market 
regulation affecting employment, environment and consumer protection like they did 
the TTIP and the CETA? 
This article argues that, while sharing some common issues and agenda with the 
TTIP and the CETA, the Japanese case failed to catch the attentions of CSOs both in 
Europe and Japan. There are four reasons for this. The first is that the EPA is still 
tackling ‘old’ issues, such as tariff reduction of cars, electronics and agricultural 
products. Opposition and hesitation to the EPA have emerged amongst Japanese 
producers and pressure groups, but in the absence of CSOs, particularly consumers. 
Related to the first reason, the second is the relative lack of new cutting-edge proposals 
compared to both the TTIP and the CETA. The third reason rests on Japan's inability to 
export its regulations. Except for the Prime Minister’s strong leadership, the Ministries, 
producer groups and politicians representing specific interests lack ability and will to do 
so. Finally, the fourth is the relatively small scale of Japan-EU trade compared to the 
TTIP. These four issues coalesce to make the level of the EPA’s contestation lower than 
that of either the TTIP or the CETA. This, though, did not automatically assure that a 
quick agreement will be reached between the EU and Japan. The Trump presidency 
abandoned the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (or the Trans-
Pacific Partnership, TPP), making Japan’s choice unpredictable. Japan can still reach 
agreement with the EU, which would demonstrate its commitment for defining future 
global trade rules. The UK’s Brexit referendum of June 2016 has, however, also made 
Japan’s trade policy more difficult and complicated, because Japanese companies have 
primarily operated their European factories in the UK (Suzuki 2015a, 2014a, 2014b) 
and have been heavily dependent upon British membership.  
2. Shifting from trade conflicts to a multilateral approach  
Japan’s flood of exports – first into the US from the early 1950s and then in the late 
1960s and early 70s into the European Economic Community (EEC) – ignited trade 
conflict between this tri-polar of major trade policy actors, which continued throughout 
the 1980s. Washington and Brussels claimed that Japan’s strategy abused free trade 
rules (Suzuki 2014a, 53), and that Japanese exports caused serious unemployment. 
Japan retorted that such claims and protectionist methods were a violation of the free 
trade rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The conflict was 
partially solved when Japanese multinationals began opening factories in America and 
Europe (Suzuki 2014a, 53-55; Suzuki 2015a), thereby reducing imports from Japan and 
encouraging employment. This, then, contributed to a reduction in the trade deficit of 
both the EC and its member states with Japan. Ultimately these conflicts faded away. 
American and European exports to Japan have gradually increased, and, even more 
importantly, the Japanese economy entered recession in the early 1990s due to the end 
of the bubble-economy and the reduction in its exports. As the former Japanese 
Ambassador Takayuki Kimura has argued, “the trade conflict was not solved, but 
disappeared without being structurally solved (Suzuki 2014c, 154).” 
The decisive turning point of the trade conflict was the end of the cold war in 
1991. The Japan-EC Joint Declaration was announced on 18 July in The Hague, shortly 
after the Japan-US Joint Declaration. The Declaration called for wider mutual 
cooperation – not only in economics and free trade, but also in peace keeping, 
prosperity and stability around the world (Waldenberger 2013, 4).  
The rapprochement bore fruit before long and the WTO was launched in 1995. 
Japan and the EU welcomed the new multilateral organisation and pursued further 
liberalisation of global trade. Compared to its predecessor, the WTO enforced its 
institutional framework and conflict mediating system (the Dispute Settlement Board). 
Particularly prominent was the case of motorcars and their components in the US , 
which was causing problems with the Clinton administration. The issue was not 
discussed through the usual bilateral negotiations but was overcome by the WTO panel. 
It was the European Commission who supported Japan’s action and favoured the 
multilateral WTO approach (Tanaka 1998, 236-237). This mutual cooperation between 
Japan and the EU, which focused on promoting rule-based liberalisation of global trade, 
continues up to the present. Although lacking binding agreements, the Japan-EU Action 
Plan of 2001 was a child of the Declaration of 1991.
2
 
However, believing that the WTO had not served in favour of American national 
interests, the Bush administration chose to depart from the multilateral approach in 
2001. Bush adopted a bilateral approach outside the framework of the WTO Doha 
Round in order to agree upon active bilateral FTAs. This approach was seen as more 
rapid and effective than waiting for the slow progress of the Round. Accordingly, Japan 
and the EU were obliged to swiftly follow the American precedent. If not, both feared 
that the lack FTA/EPAs would damage their industries' access to the markets. Asian 
Pacific and Latin American countries became one of the main focuses of Japan and 
Europe. 
3. The first stage of Japan’s EPAs: Asian Pacific and Latin American 
countries  
It has been understood that EU’s (reluctant) shift from a multilateral approach under the 
WTO and to a bilateral FTA strategy was caused by three factors (Woolcock 2010, 396-
398).
3
 The first was the Doha Round’s lack of progress. The second was the shift of 
other major WTO members toward active FTA strategies. For example, China adopted 
a new trade policy in 2000 and approached the ASEAN. China was closely followed up 
and countered by Japan and India. Finally, and most crucially, was the Bush 
administration. Under the Trade Promotion Authority of 2001 they pursued active FTA 
negotiations with Central America, Thailand, Korea and the Southern Africa Customs 
Union (SACU). These three fuses sparked a global trend, which saw countries pursuing 
bilateral FTA/EPAs outside the WTO Round. 
From a Japanese perspective, however, it was the EU which made the earlier 
shift towards the bilateral FTA/EPA approach than Japan. The Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETRO) interprets Japan’s gradual steps toward FTA/EPAs as having 
being propelled by two issues: the deadlock of the Doha Round and developing 
countries’ shift towards liberalising trade.4 Urata points out that a sense of “exclusion 
fear” pushed East Asian countries toward FTA negotiations (Urata 2009). Japan’s 
gradual and reluctant shift toward FTA/EPAs was evident in its negotiations with the 
Latin American countries. More precisely, the EU shifted towards the bilateral approach 
earlier than Japan in its relations with the Latin American countries. In contrast Japan 
responded gradually and engaged in bilateral relations with the Asian Pacific countries 
earlier than the EU. These choices forced Japan into a difficult position of passive 
reaction. Japan was the last to sit down and negotiate with Mexico and Chile. The US 
and EU had led the way. This lead Japan to make compromises in agriculture at a level 
never witnessed in its earlier history (Suzuki 2015c). 
For Japan, the highest priority in trade negotiations has been the Asian-Pacific 
countries. Japanese motorcar and electronic multinationals run plants – which distribute 
goods domestically and export to Japan – in countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, and 
the Philippines. Asian countries have been indispensable to Japanese industry as both 
supply chain and outlet market. Such facts partly explain why Japan has provided a 
certain amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA) to these countries since the 
1960s, a tendency that has not changed. The first country with which Japan signed an 
EPA was Singapore. This entered into force in November 2002. Since then Japan has 
entered into the first stage of pursuing bilateral FTA/EPAs, negotiating with most of the 
Asian Pacific countries (Urata 2009). These EPAs have steadily come into force since 
the July 2006 agreement with Malaysia. In November 2007 Japan initiated an EPA with 
Thailand, followed in July 2008 by another with Indonesia and Brunei, in December 
with the Philippines and the ASEAN, in October 2009 with Vietnam, in August 2011 
with India, and finally in July 2014 with Australia. The only exceptions are Korea and 
China.
5
 This was spurred by a strategy that looked to conclude “as many [neighbouring 
Asian countries] as possible” and “in the order of negotiable.” 
 
(Table 1. Japan-ASEAN trade (2006)) 
 
In contrast to the EPAs with the Asian Pacific countries, Japan began its 
negotiations with Latin American countries later than the US and the EU. The EU 
agreed the Partnership Agreement with Mexico in 1997, which entered into force in 
2000.
6
 It signed the Association Agreement with Chile in 2002 and the Agreement 
finally entered into force in March 2005. Japan started negotiations with these countries 
later and in a more passive manner. Japan’s EPAs with Mexico, Chile, and Peru began 
as an attempt to catch up with the US and the EU. The aim of these negotiations was to 
avoid reduced market access for Japanese multinationals, especially motorcars. The 
Japan-Mexico EPA was enacted in April 2005. This was followed by the Japan-Chile 
EPA in September 2007, and lastly by the Japan-Peru EPA of March 2012. 
The Japan-Mexico EPA intended to reduce tariffs of industrial and agricultural 
products, to promote trade of services and investment, and to open public procurement 
for Japanese multinationals in Mexico.
7
 Mexico has been crucial for Japanese 
multinationals in the motorcar industry, since plants located in Mexico produce and sell 
domestically and also export to the North American market. For Japan it was crucial 
that tariffs on motorcars, electrical products and their components were abolished. In 
the agricultural sphere, Mexico gained preferential quotas in Japan for pork, beef, 
chicken, oranges and orange juice.
8
  
The Mexican case became a crucial forerunner to later negotiations with Chile 
and Peru. This was a compromise that Japan had hardly made with the US and the 
EC/EU during their history of trade conflicts. Up to this point, Japan had enjoyed a 
period of not being targeted by the US, unlike the EEC/EC and its Common Agriculture 
Policy (CAP) during the GATT Rounds. Japan had adopted a tactic of liberalising very 
specific items within the agricultural sector. Yet, when the tensions of trade conflicts 
had grown higher, Japan had made compromises of lowering its tariffs on beef and 
orange for the US in the 1980s, and on Scottish whiskey and spirits for the EC/EU in 
the 1990s. Other items, rice being prominent among them, had barely appeared on the 
agenda in negotiations. These compromises in agriculture were used symbolically and 
highlight the peak of trade conflicts, which eventually died down and were forgotten. 
The EPA with Chile was similar in content and tone to that between Japan and 
Mexico. Chile had already agreed upon FTAs with more than 40 countries and regions 
including the US, the EU, Korea, and China. The EPA allowed for Chile’s tariff-free 
exports to Japan to increase from 30% to 90%.
9
 Chile’s exports to Japan are mostly 
natural resources such as copper and molybdenum steel. What was remarkable, 
however, was that Japanese import tariffs on salmon, pork, wine and wood were also 
reduced. Chilean wine has rapidly become a popular product in Japanese supermarkets. 
The most recent trade agreement with Peru went even further than the Japan-
Chile EPA. The following decade has seen both countries abolish tariffs on all 
products.
10
 This includes Peru’s exports of pork, chicken, asparagus, corn, eel and 
wood. In turn Japan has seen increased access not only of motorcar, motorcycle and 
electrical products, but also of sweet potatoe, apple, pear, persimmon, green tee, and 
alcohol (sake). This was a strikingly novel decision. Previously Japan had shown little 
interest in promoting exports of agricultural products. Such efforts would, in turn, lead 
to opening the Japanese agriculture market to imports. These unique compromises in the 
agricultural sector have offered the EU the chance to expand their export of agriculture 
products towards Japan. Wine and cheese are known to be priority items.
11
 
4. The second stage: EPA negotiations with the EU and the US  
4-1. The Japan-EU negotiations  
The early stages of the Japan-EU EPA negotiation started in May 2011. Japan-EU trade 
occupied 35.7% of the global total in 2013.
12
 The EPA is expected to promote not only 
economic growth and employment but also to help the parties jointly set the rules of 
global trade. Japan requested a reduction of the EU’s tariffs on motorcars (11%) and 
electronic products (14%). In return the EU asked Japan to reduce tariffs and abolish 
non-tariff barriers (NTB) for motorcars, chemical products, electronic products, 
processed food, food security regulations, medical equipment and medicine, and to open 
public procurement.
13
 The following sections will focus on the three most contested 
issues, agriculture, public procurement of railway infrastructure and the kei-car category 
as an NTB.  
The EU-Japan EPA could be characterised by its emphasis on ‘old’ issues of 
reducing tariffs and its lack of innovative and ambitious proposals such as the TTIP and 
the CETA. This led to the relative lack of opposition to the EPA amongst CSOs in both 
Europe and Japan, but this has not meant an early conclusion of the negotiations. The 
negotiation has faced serious opposition by Japanese pressure groups and politicians 
representing specific sectorial interests. Ministries are also divided in whether they 
support or oppose the EPA. However, the firm support of the Japanese Prime Minister’s 
leadership that is seeking to boost Japanese economy – which would secure a successful 
2020 Tokyo Olympic Games – has been key.  
How has the Japanese case become ‘exceptional’ among the EU’s FTA/EPAs? 
After succeeding in her EPA negotiations with neighbouring Asian Pacific countries, 
the second stage of Japan’s FTA negotiations began when Japan concluded its EPA 
negotiations with neighbouring Asian Pacific countries and decided to enter into 
negotiations with its global partners – the US and the EU.14 Japan’s trade policy has 
now entered into an ‘active’ and challenging second stage, in which both the chances 
and risks run higher. Since Japanese multinationals have been operating factories in the 
US and the EU member states for more than three decades, to what extent could Japan 
profit from an FTA/EPA with the EU? Japanese motorcars produced in these 
establishments are consumed by Europeans in greater number than those that are being 
exported from factories in Japan. Rather than an “expectation deficit” for both Japan 
and the EU (Tsuruoka 2008, 107-126), it seems doubtful whether both sides have any 
expectations at all. This is evident when practical issues such as Europe’s abolition of 
tariffs on Japanese motorcars, Japan’s abandoning of NTBs on motorcars, and opening 
public procurement are in question. What is more evident is a participation deficit of 
CSOs in both Europe and Japan, while contestation among producers’ pressure groups 
and politicians have heated up in Japan, where they are debating the regulation of 
imports of agricultural products, railway carriages and small-sized family cars made in 
Europe. 
 
Japan’s negotiation with the EU goes back to May 2011 under the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ, from 26 March 2016 onwards the Democratic Party, DP) coalition 
government under Prime Minister Naoto Kan. Before starting the EPA negotiations, 
Japan and the EU agreed to launch a scoping exercise at the Japan-EU Summit on 28 
May 2011. The 11 March tsunami and nuclear disaster, which occurred shortly before 
the decision, played a role in prompting EU member states to help Japan economically. 
The scoping exercise was concluded in July 2012 and led the European Commission to 
propose that the Council of Foreign Ministers authorise negotiations. The Council 
agreed in Madrid the following November and adopted the mandate.  
 
(Table 2. Japan’s trade with the EU) 
 
In December 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won the election by 
securing a majority alongside with the Komei Party. The DPJ’s centre-left 
administration initiated the TPP and the Japan-EU trade negotiations, and was now 
succeeded by a right-wing Shinzo Abe’s coalition. Abe proposed a policy centred upon 
allowing inflation and nurturing a booming economy – this has come to be termed 
Abenomics. Stock prices recovered to the levels before the global financial shock of 
2008 and Japanese Yen was devaluated. Both factors allowed Japanese industry to 
increase its exports. In terms of trade policy, Abe allied himself to the DPJ’s policy of 
pursuing EPAs and has, in fact, enhanced it by improving the performance of the 
Japanese economy. The first phase of the Japan-EU EPA negotiations took place in 
Brussels in April 2013, followed by the second in Tokyo in June, the third and fourth 
were also in Brussels during October 2013 and January 2014, and the fifth during 
March/April in Tokyo. 
4-2. Sensible issues and the TPP: agriculture 
The trade policy of post-war Japan focused on the US, and this trend has continued. 
Japan’s deeply embedded American bias is not only a consequence of economic 
relations and interdependence but also orientates around her security alliance with the 
US. Therefore Japanese trade relations have been and will be decided through the prism 
of US-Japanese relations. However, the TPP negotiations, which began in 2006, are not 
solely carried out between Japan and the US. It was originally launched by Singapore, 
New Zeeland, Chile and Brunei. The US only joined in March 2010, followed by Japan 
– even later – in July 2013. The list of 12 countries that took part at the end of the 
negotiations also included Australia, Peru, Malaysia, Vietnam, Canada, and Mexico. 
Together, these countries account for 38% of the world’s annual GDP.15  
How new is the TPP when compared to the former trade agreements, and might 
it affect the Japan-EU negotiations? The first thing to point out is that Japan’s 
participation in the TPP was not a mere follow up to its EPAs with Asian Pacific 
countries. In fact it had a fundamentally new dimension – different to these earlier 
cases. First and for most, the US has become a direct negotiating partner within the 
Asia-Pacific region during the Obama administration, since it was a country that also 
saw that its vital interests lie in the region. Secondly, the TPP was more wide reaching 
than previous agreements: the issues covered aside from trade and tariff reduction 
include investment, NTBs, public procurement, intellectual property rights, the 
environment, and labour issues.
16
 Chances to expand Japan’s export market are 
inevitably interrelated with the liberalisation of Japanese imports, investment, and the 
regulations of various service sectors. 
The Abe administration has been pressed to conclude and implement the TPP 
and the EPA by Japanese multinationals and the business lobbying group Keidanren. In 
the EU agriculture is a divisive issue that is difficult to put on the table (Roederer-
Rynning and Schimmelfennig 2012, 951-968). Japan faces a similar problem. The 
extent to which the centralised power of the agricultural producers’ group – JA (nokyo) 
- could be reduced rests on the question of liberalising Japanese imports.
17
 The EPAs 
with Latin American countries, which have succeeded in liberalising the protected 
Japanese market, indicate that Japan could conclude similar agreements with the EU. 
These issues revolve around certain products: wine, beef, pork and dairy products. 
Chocolate and pasta were subsequently added to EU’s list because the TPP included 
tariff deductions for these items. These compromises are not only due to Japanese 
bureaucracy favouring path dependency, but also reflect the nature of trade agreements, 
which allow any other countries/regions to obtain the same contents as agreed earlier. 
The strongest opposition, as has been the case elsewhere, comes from the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) and JA. 
While Japan-US bilateral negotiations have focused on motorcars, the Japanese 
government – namely MAFF – keenly manoeuvred to protect the agricultural sector. 
The five “sacred items,” which are rice, wheat, beef/pork, dairy products and sugarcane, 
were excluded from the TPP’s initial aim of abolishing tariffs on all items until 2015. 
MAFF announced that 4.5 trillion Yen of Japanese agricultural production would be lost 
if tariffs were immediately abolished.
18
 The reasons lying behind the protection of these 
five items are sensible political and social structures (Rothacher 2013, 240-254). 
Dismantling these “sacred” five had seemed a mission-impossible until Mexico, Chile 
and Peru succeeded in liberalising the pork market. Thus, other items such as wine, 
dairy products and chicken could have a fair chance of following a similar trend. This is 
not only the case in negotiations with the US and the TPP countries but also with the 
EU. The Japan-EU negotiations succeeded in reducing tariffs on pork in December 
2016. However, this went further in January 2017 when the EU requested the 100% 
abolition of cheese tariffs,
19
 which marks a further retreat for Japan than the TPP 
negotiations.
20
 The EU’s possible elimination of tariffs for Japanese motorcars and 
Japan’s abandoning of cheese tariffs have become the final points of negotiation. 
In response to Japan’s request that the EU abolish tariffs on Japanese motorcars 
and electronics, the European Commission has demanded the reduction of Japanese 
tariffs on agricultural imports. The EU’s closest ally on this matter is Japanese Prime 
Minister Abe. He sought to reinforce Japanese competitiveness by raising agriculture as 
one of the strategic and innovative targets of Abenomics.
21
 A crucial aim was to further 
promote Japanese exports by lowering import tariffs and to demonstrate Japan’s ability 
to write the rules of global trade. Decades ago liberalisation of imports could have faced 
unified and determined opposition from the agriculture sector and politicians 
representing those interest groups. Although these groups still voice opposition, they 
have decreased in volume, which was a tendency formerly witnessed in Japan’s EPA 
negotiations with Mexico, Chile and Peru, and, although with limits, also in the TPP. 
MAFF is in favour of reforming JA and supports Prime Minister Abe’s reforms. MAFF 
departs from its support for Abenomics and opposes, however, the liberalisation of 
imports. MAFF claims that JA’s reform requires a breathing-space and therefore import 
liberalisation must be strictly limited or postponed as far as possible. While Abe is 
seeking for a reform based on the pressures of trade liberalisation, MAFF is claiming 
success without these changes. 
Despite being persuaded by MAFF that its organisation structure, pricing policy 
and distribution system are all outdated and far from cost-effective, JA firmly refuses to 
reform itself and opposes the liberalisation of imports. A minority of JA leaders and 
young farmers are, however, calling for reform and supporting Abe's leadership and the 
expansion of Japanese agricultural exports (Yamashita 2016, 322-352). These 
reformists are inspired by a new generation of Japanese agriculture economists 
(Yamashita 2011) but are isolated. Consumers' inputs, which should logically support 
cheaper food prices that come with increased imports, are almost totally absent in the 
picture, showing a sharp contrast to those of the EU. The reformists are, however, 
supported by Keidanren and major supermarket franchises that are encouraging young 
farmers to bypass JA and become their direct business partners.  
Politicians of both the LDP and the DP are divided on the issue. Those from 
rural constituencies depend on JA members’ votes and therefore support JA’s claims. 
Those politicians that are specialised in the agricultural sector and have strong links 
with both JA and MAFF stand on a more complex platform, because MAFF is in favour 
of reforming JA and supporting Prime Minister Abe’s reforms (Yomiuri Shinbun 
Economy 265-278, 280-281) and therefore disagrees with JA. They act as a bridge 
between Abe, MAFF and JA, by attempting to mediate between reformists and the 
majority of JA members. Both reformist politicians and MAFF share the trauma 
induced by the disastrous failure of domestic compensations made after the GATT 
Uruguay Round. Six trillion Yen of compensation funding made little difference either 
by increasing output or reducing costs of Japanese agriculture. “Never repeat the same 
mistake” became the shared motto of those politicians and MAFF (Yomiuri Shinbun 
Economy 77-78). Butter shortage in run up to Christmas has become a recurring 
problem in Japan. This case is suggestive of how the EU’s free exports of dairy 
products could help to avoid such administrative failures in Japan. The absence of 
consumer criticism is primarily caused by the myth that Japanese agricultural products 
are of higher quality and safer, and that the high food price in Japan is the necessary 
cost of saving the farmers. This is a product of JA’s propaganda (Yamashita 2017, 51-
52).  In reality it is saving JA but not the aging farmers whose income are dropping 
(OECD 2017, 103-105). 
 
4-3. Public procurement of railway infrastructure and the kei-car category as 
NTB 
Motorcars, railway infrastructure and high-technology goods have remained on the top 
of Japan’s list of exports. Why, then, has Japan’s attitude been relatively defensive in 
the TPP and the Japan-EU EPA negotiations in these sectors? As seen in the previous 
section, one obvious cause was agriculture where import liberalisation was still difficult. 
The other problem rests within the sectors themselves, which is hindering the expansion 
of exports – the central aim of Abenomics. Japan, unlike the US and the EU, has 
abolished tariffs on motorcars and now must negotiate NTBs in order to provide further 
market access for foreign manufacturers. The distinctive Japanese kei-car category came 
into question. The public procurement of railway carriages is another revealing case 
where lack of transparency has been criticised by the European Commission. The 
absence of CSO’s input in these issues is common to the agricultural case and 
consumers have not exercised their voice. Japanese trade unions – moderate and 
restrained in their approach – have voiced their concern over any potential loss of 
employment. This has coincided with the European Trade Union Confederation's 
(ETUC) reluctance to support the EPA.  
The domestic Japanese railway industry supplies nearly 100% of internal 
demand. The European Commission – under pressure from the ‘European’ champions 
Alstom, Siemens and Bombardier – has criticised the Japanese railway operators and 
argued that there was a lack of transparency in the procedures involved in purchasing 
contracts, which, therefore, unfairly excludes European firms. Public procurement has 
been one of the most significant issues, alongside agriculture, for the EU.
22
 Since March 
2014 Japan, the European Commission and both parties’ railway industries have been 
holding mutual consultations biannually in Brussels and Tokyo. The Ministry of Land, 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) has countered the EU’s arguments that 
Japan has imported railway related components and is, in fact, operating a trade deficit 
with the EU, and that there are ongoing efforts to open public procurement.
23
 Japanese 
optimism suggests that they believe the Japan-EU EPA will be successfully 
concluded.
24
  
In discussions over NTBs, both the US and the EU have questioned the Japanese 
categorisation of kei-cars. The kei is the grouping of the smallest sized motorcars with 
engines up to 660cc. This class has enjoyed significantly lower tax burden – making 
them popular among Japanese consumers purchasing second cars for family use. 
Contrary to the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) and MLIT’s 
insistence on preserving the current category, the European Commission and the 
European Automobile Manufacturers' Association (ACEA) have continuously claimed 
that the kei category is an NTB. European producers could and would not develop such 
models, since they do not meet European nor American safety standards. Despite 
European companies being highly competitive in motorcars with small and ecological 
engines of around 1000cc, the kei diminishes these manufacturers’ chances in the 
Japanese small car sales market. Japanese trade unions wish to preserve the kei in order 
to secure employment in Japan. Such voices hinder Prime Minister Abe's will to 
conclude an ambitious agreement that would allow Japanese multinational to compete 
on equal footing with the Koreans who have FTAs with both the US and the EU (Elsig 
and Dupont 2012). Japanese trade unions have not, however, countered the TPP nor the 
Japan-EU EPA in a consistent manner.
25
  The unions, the Rengou, are more focused on 
improving domestic working conditions and family welfare issues.
26
 Japanese unions 
are structured on companies and lack horizontal unity within sectors. Furthermore, 
Rengou suffer from their own ideological diversity, with members from the centre-left 
to left.  
Owing to the strong bias of producers’ superiority and weak consumers’ 
representation in Japanese decision-making (OECD 2006, 182-183, 202), kei-users’ call 
to keep the category have not affected the EPA negotiations. The lack of contestation 
therefore gives the European Commission an advantage in the negotiations when 
criticising the kei as an NTB. Compared to the EU, Japan lacks ability to export 
regulations and standards (Damro 2012). Thus, the kei-cars do not have the slightest 
possibility of being exported to the EU or the US. Japan finds itself unexpectedly 
defensive on this issue. 
4-4. The TPP, the TTIP and Brexit combined; has the agreement been delayed 
due to uncertainty and path dependency? 
Japan’s geo-political standing – as a country with scarce raw materials and limited food 
supplies – mean that, in the longer term, Japan is expected to actively pursue further 
liberalisation of trade and capital. Could short- or middle-term events, however, re-
focus Japanese policy and interrupt or discourage the Japan-EU EPA negotiations? Two 
recent events must be taken into account, the US Presidential election of November 
2016 and Britain’s decision to leave the EU in the ‘Brexit’ referendum of June 2016. 
The media – both in Japan and the US – have focused on Donald Trump’s 
misleading statements during his election campaigns, which have threatened to 
undermine the Japan-US alliance. Yet, Japan’s primary concern was that both Trump 
and Hilary Clinton were against ratifying the TPP. American trade unions were opposed 
to the TPP. Thus, Clinton, as the Democrat’s candidate, necessarily respected such 
voices. Japan saw these as signs that the TPP would not enter into force under the 
Obama administration. Furthermore, in Bratislava on 23 September, the EU also 
abandoned the possibility of the TTIP reaching a conclusion during the Obama 
presidency.
27
  This had added to Japan’s hesitancy in concluding their agreement with 
the EU first. These patterns reveal Japan’s path dependency – demonstrating their 
mirroring of the United States: when American does not move, Japan follows suit 
(Gilson 2016, 1-16). If there is no deal with America, then it follows that there will be 
no deal with the EU. This was the case of the Japan-EC Joint Declaration of 1991. 
History could simply repeat itself unless ambitious and innovative efforts are made. If 
the Japan-EU EPA is concluded and ratified before the TPP, it would mark a historical 
watershed. This would signal a departure from Japan’s “America first” approach that 
predominated throughout the post-war era. It would, however, be dangerous for Japan to 
conclude a deal with the Europeans when the exact terms of the deal with the US and 
the TPP countries have recently been put into question.. Although the Trump 
administration abandoned the TPP, the fact remains that the US is a larger trade partner 
than the EU for Japan. 
The second issue, Brexit, is also a real concern for the Japanese government. 
The Japanese motorcar industry operates plants in the UK: Nissan-Renault in 
Sunderland, Toyota in Burnaston, and Honda in Swindon. Japan has relied heavily on 
the UK government’s support. Japanese green-field plants were first accommodated in 
Europe under Margret Thatcher and provided Japan’s gateway into the EC/EU market 
(Suzuki 2015a, 2014a, 2014b). If the UK government pursue a policy of ‘hard-Brexit,’ 
Japanese motorcars face an 11% customs duty if exporting to the EU market. In 
consequence, investment in the British plants would be reduced or withdrawn. Indeed, 
companies may choose to re-locate – both plants and jobs – to the continent.28 The Abe 
administration launched a Brexit task force on 27 July 2016 in order to monitor the 
proceedings.
29
 Before the exact terms of Brexit are made clear, it is a risk for Japan to 
agree on any concrete terms in the Japan-EU EPA. This could diminish Japanese 
industry’s gains from any agreement and might solely be to the advantage of the EU and 
member states on the continent. Ironically this could be the reason why the EU and 
member states seem to be keen to rapidly conclude negotiations. Japanese negotiators 
have testified that their EU counterparts have shown strong desire to demonstrate 
achievement in trade relations.
30
 It might be argued that the EU hopes to use a fixed 
Japan-EU agreement as a bargaining chip and demonstration of strength in Brexit 
negotiations with the UK government. 
Considering these two potential barriers, what are the odds for the successful 
completion of Japan-EU EPA negotiations? The Abe administration is focused on 
boosting the Japanese economy in preparation for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games. The 
cabinet announced its policy on 27 November 2015.
31
 This has left the government with 
few alternatives to the successful realisation of both the TPP, although without the US, 
and the Japan-EU EPA. METI has echoed the view of the administration and promoted 
both the TPP and the Japan-EU EPA.
32
 METI has emphasised the role of globally 
competitive multinationals and the importance of creating chances for small- and 
middle-sized firms, which would facilitate grass-roots growth – thereby boosting the 
Japanese economy. Keidanren is in complete harmony with METI.
33
 The Abe 
administration has, however, also put emphasis on attracting foreign tourists to Japan 
and immersing them in Japanese food and culture in 2020.
34
 As such, MAFF and JA 
will find it difficult to insist upon their traditional protectionist measures while 
simultaneously being urged to make new efforts to liberalise imports and to export 
Japanese agricultural products. Therefore Japan is committed to the completion of the 
Japan-EU EPA. It is only hesitant about the timing of the agreement’s signing, due to 
the uncertainties caused by both the new US President and Brexit.
35
 
5.Conclusions 
Unlike the negotiations between the EU and the US over the TTIP (Dominguez this 
volume) and Canada over the CETA (Hübner, Balik and Deman this volume), the EPA 
negotiations with Japan have encountered few critics from CSOs. Why has the Japanese 
case become an ‘exception’ to the EU’s FTA/EPAs? This article concludes that the 
Japan-EU EPA failed to catch the attention of CSOs due to four key reasons. The first is 
that the main focus of the EPA is still on ‘old’ issues such as tariff reduction of 
motorcars, electronics and agricultural products. In the absence of CSOs, in particular 
Japanese consumers’ representation, producers under the JAMA and JA and politicians 
who speak for those sectors have dominated the debate. This has hindered Prime 
Minister Abe’s intention to boost the Japanese economy and Japan’s ability to play a 
leading role in writing global trade rules. The second reason, related to the first, is the 
relative lack of innovative proposals compared to those found in the TTIP and the 
CETA. Japanese trade unions have been cautious when supporting the EPA with 
employment issues in mind. Yet they have been mute compared to their European 
counterparts. The third is Japan's lack of competitiveness and inability to export its 
regulations. MLIT and MAFF are reluctant to reform the market regulations and to 
liberalise imports. The distinctive Japanese category of kei-cars has not flourished in the 
US or the EU. Although its competitiveness in the motorcar sector remains, Japan has 
negotiated with the European Commission in a defensive manner. Finally, the scale of 
EU-Japan trade compared to the TTIP is modest and therefore fails to attract the 
interests of CSOs in Europe. These four issues have made the level of contestation 
relatively low, particularly when compared with the TTIP and the CETA negotiations. 
The uncertainty caused by the Trump administration’s abandonment of the TPP and by 
the UK’s Brexit referendum of June 2016 have complicated Japan’s trade policy, 
making it unpredictable than ever. Japan could still reach an agreement with the EU and 
forcefully assert its commitment to define future global trade rules, especially since the 
TPP is doomed.  
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Table 1. Japan’s trade with the ASEAN 
Japan's export to the ASEAN 
(8.34 tril. Yen, 2008) 
Japan's import from ASEAN 
(8.99 tril. Yen, 2006) 
Electronic 29% Mineral fuels 28.8% 
Machinery 21.6% Electronics 18% 
Vehicles 9% Machinery 10.3% 
Steel 7.4% Wood 4.4% 
Precision machinery 4.1% Ore 3.9% 
Plastic 3.8% Rubber 3.3% 
Steel products 3.8% Marine products 2.6% 
Organic chemical 2.2% Plastic 2.3% 
Pearl/jewelry 2% Precision machinery 2.1% 
Copper 1.6% Footwear 0.6% 
Others 15.3% Others 22.8% 
Source: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/fta/j_asean/pdfs/jasean_gaiyou.pdf> 
Accessed on 26 Feb. 2014 and modified by author. 
  
 Table 2. Japan’s trade with the EU 
Japan's export to EU 
(7 tril. Yen, 2013) 
Japan's import from EU 
(7.6 tril. Yen, 2013) 
Chemical products 11.3% Food 14.5% 
Material 7.3% Mineral fuels 1.3% 
Machinery 26.3% Chemical products 33% 
Electronics 20% Material 6.8% 
Transportation 20.2% Machinery 10.3% 
Others 14.7% Electronics 8.6% 
  Transportation 14.3% 
  Others 14.2% 
Source: < http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000013819.pdf > Accessed on 26 Feb. 
2015 and modified by author. 
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